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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL 
DISCRIMINATION. The debtors, husband and wife, were 
both employed by a livestock auction business but had also 
started two separate businesses, both of which failed. The second 
failure resulted in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in which the 
debtors lost title to their car. The debtors asked their employer 
to purchase a car for them for use in the business but the employer 
responded by terminating the employment of both debtors. The 
debtors sought damages for violation of Section 525(b). The 
Bankruptcy Court held that the debtors failed to prove that the 
employment termination resulted solely because of the 
bankruptcy filing, noting evidence of other employment 
problems. The debtors argued that they need show only that the 
employment termination resulted primarily because of the 
bankruptcy filing. The court held that the term “solely” in Section 
525(b) presented the debtors with a high but not unreasonable 
burden of proof before Section 525(b) would be applied. White 
v. Kentuckiana Livestock Market, Inc., 397 F.3d 420 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
FEDERAL TAXATION 
DISCHARGE. The debtor timely filed accurate income tax 
returns several tax years more than three years before the filing 
for Chapter 7; however, the debtor made only partial payment 
of the taxes owed. The debtor lived in a resort community and 
made all payments on a house, dined and entertained at the 
community club, paid club dues, paid for elective cosmetic 
surgery, donated to charities, gave money gifts to their children, 
and paid for college education fees while failing to make 
additional payments on the taxes owed. Although the court 
acknowledged that the debtor lived an affluent life-style, the 
court court held that was not sufficient conduct to prove willful 
evasion of taxes such as to make the taxes nondischargeable 
under Section 523(a)(1)(C). The court noted that the mere 
election not to pay taxes while able to do so did not constitute 
evasion. The court distinguished the case from In re Griffith, 
206 F.3d 1391 (11th Cir. 2000) in that the debtor was not shown 
to have attempted to conceal or remove assets without 
consideration. Comment: the court seems to indicate that there 
is some distinction between the intentions of a debtor who 
removes assets from potential collection by purchasing 
discretionary, high-priced goods and services and making family 
gifts (the present case) and the intentions of a debtor who transfers 
property to third parties with the understanding that the debtor 
can retain or regain control (In re Griffith). In both cases, the 
debtor still acquired a benefit of the transfer when taxes were 
owed and the IRS lost the ability to access the property; therefore, 
the fresh start of discharge should be denied to the debtor who 
benefitted from the debtor’s own election not to pay taxes. In re 
Jacobs, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,329 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2005).
   FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim 
regulations which change the classification of Florida to 
brucellosis-free. 70 Fed. Reg. 22588 (May 2, 2005). 
CROP RISK MANAGEMENT. The FCIC, through the 
Risk Management Agency, has announced the availability of 
approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2005 for collaborative 
outreach and assistance programs for women, limited resource, 
socially disadvantaged and other traditionally under-served 
farmers and ranchers, who produce priority commodities. 70 
Fed. Reg. 23963 (May 6, 2005). 
The FCIC, through the Risk Management Agency, has 
announced the availability of approximately $4 million in 
fiscal year 2005 for Risk Management Research Partnerships 
for the development of non-insurance risk management tools 
that can be utilized by agricultural producers to assist them in 
mitigating the risks inherent in agricultural production. 70 Fed. 
Reg. 23969 (May 6, 2005). 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS. The 
APHIS has adopted as final regulations that require permits 
for the introduction of plant genetically engineered for the 
production of compounds for industrial use. 70 Fed. Reg. 
23009 (May 4, 2005). 
KARNAL BUNT. The APHIS has adopted as  final 
regulations that amend the Karnal bunt regulations to provide 
for the payment of compensation to custom harvesters for 
losses they incurred due to the requirement that their 
equipment be cleaned and disinfected after four counties in 
northern Texas were declared regulated areas for Karnal bunt 
during the 2000-2001 crop season. The interim regulations 
had also amended the regulations to provide for the payment 
of compensation to owners or lessees of other equipment that 
came into contact with Karnal bunt-positive host crops in those 
counties and was required to be cleaned and disinfected during 
the 2000-2001 crop season. This final regulations amend the 
interim rule to indicate that affected parties may apply for 
compensation whenever disinfection was required by an 
inspector and to extend the deadline by which claims for 
compensation must have been submitted. 70 Fed. Reg. 24297 
(May 9, 2005). 
WETLANDS. The plaintiffs were found by the National 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) to have converted 
20.9 acres of wetlands via drainage activities. The plaintiffs 
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appealed the NRCS determination to the county FSA 
committee which recommended the loss of $6,000 in farm 
program benefits by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought 
another field inspection which determined that only 10.4 
acres were converted. The state FSA Committee reviewed 
the findings and increased the penalty to a loss of $46,960 of 
farm program benefits. The plaintiff continued to seek 
administrative review, and a hearing officer reversed the state 
FSA Committee ruling because the plaintiffs may have 
qualified for a “minimal effect” exemption since the state 
committee erroneously relied on a technique for determining 
“minimal effect” that had not yet been approved. That 
decision was in turn reversed by the National Appeals 
Division and the case was submitted for court review. The 
first reviewing court granted the FSA’s motion for summary 
judgment, but remanded case to the FSA for new minimal 
effect exemption calculation based on a functional assessment 
satisfying 7 C.F.R. § 12.30(a)(3). In response, the FSA 
adopted three assessment models in May 2003 and applied 
them to the plaintiff’s case to find that no minimal effect 
exemption was available. On further appeal, the court held 
that the FSA could not use an assessment model approved in 
2003 to calculate a minimal effect exemption for an alleged 
violation in 1999. The court held that such retroactive 
application of standards was an abuse of discretion and 
arbitrary and capricious. The court ordered restoration of all 
farm program payments, plus interest from the date of the 
first denial of program payments to the date of the final order 
in this appeal. Rosenau v. Farm Service Agency, No. AI­
02-01, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8779 (D. N.D. May 11, 2005).
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
DISCLAIMERS. The decedent had established a trust for 
the benefit of the decedent’s grandchildren. The trust was 
funded with personal property from the decedent’s estate. 
Within nine months after the death of the decedent, the 
grandchildren executed written disclaimers of either specific 
personal property or their share in personal property. Under 
the trust, disclaimed property passed to a donor-advised fund 
trust for a tax-exempt foundation. Under the fund trust 
agreement, the grandchildren could make recommendations 
as to the foundation’s use of the disclaimed property but the 
foundation was not required to follow the requests. The IRS 
ruled that the disclaimers were qualified disclaimers under 
I.R.C. § 2518 and the estate could claim charitable deductions 
for the value of the disclaimed property passing to the 
foundation. Ltr. Rul. 200518012, Dec. 17, 2004. 
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION. The 
decedent was a beneficiary of a trust which owned all of the 
stock of two corporations. The corporations both operated 
retail automobile dealerships and the decedent was the 
director, president and treasurer of both corporations and was 
actively involved in the business operations of the corporations. 
The decedent owned the real property used by the dealerships 
and leased the buildings to the corporation for use in the 
businesses. The IRS ruled that the real property was held by the 
decedent as business property because the property was essential 
to the operation of the businesses owned by the corporations. 
The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interests in the corporations 
and real property were interests in a closely-held business for 
purposes of I.R.C. § 6166 and the estate could elect to pay the 
federal estate tax in installments. The IRS also ruled that the 
decedent’s interests in the corporations and real property 
constituted qualified family-owned business interests under 
I.R.C. § 2057 eligible for the family-owned business deduction. 
Ltr. Rul. 200518011, Jan. 14, 2005. 
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX. The 
decedent owned several commercial properties and some real 
estate held for investment. The properties were owned through 
and operated by several corporations and partnerships but the 
decedent was actively involved in the operations of the 
businesses. The estate passed to the decedent’s spouse either 
directly or through trusts and the spouse continued the business 
operations. The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interests in the 
active business properties were qualified closely-held business 
interests for purposes of I.R.C. § 6166, allowing the estate to 
pay the federal estate tax on those interest by installments. The 
Digest will publish an article by Neil Harl on this ruling in a 
future issue. Ltr. Rul. 200518047, Jan. 27, 2005. 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The 
decedents, husband and wife, had created a living trust with their 
personal assets. The trust interests were contributed to a family 
limited partnership with some of the partnership interests 
transferred by gift to the decedents’ children.  The partnership, 
however, continued to pay for the decedents’ personal living and 
medical expenses. The court held that the decedents’ interests in 
the partnership transferred to the children were included in the 
decedents’ gross estates because the continued use of the 
partnership assets for the decedents’ personal expenses 
demonstrated that there was an implied agreement between the 
children and the decedents that the partnership assets were 
available to the decedents for as long as they needed income. 
Estate of Korby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-102; Estate of 
Korby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-103. 
VALUATION. The decedent had won a state lottery in 1999 
and was to receive 20 annual checks for $100,000. Under state 
law, the decedent could not assign the right to the installments. 
The decedent died after receiving only one check. The court held 
that the right to receive the remaining checks was an “ordinary 
annuity interest” and was to be valued using the I.R.C. § 7520 
annuity tables without any reduction for the limitation on the 
marketability of the annual installments. Donovan v. United 




BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was employed as a 
sales representative for a roofing company. The taxpayer 
claimed deductions for travel expenses incurred while 
employed which were not reimbursed by the employer. The 
taxpayer supported the claimed deductions with a spreadsheet 
of the claimed trips, although the taxpayer admitted that most 
of the entries were reconstructed in preparation for trial. The 
taxpayer did not have any written records to support the 
reconstructed entries. The taxpayer also used credit card 
statements to support the deduction for meals and 
entertainment expenses. The court held that the expenses were 
not deductible for failure to have sufficient substantiating 
records. Barton v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-97. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer 
sued an employer for improper termination of employment as 
discrimination. Although the taxpayer’s employment troubles 
arose out of a medical condition, the lawsuit did not allege 
that the employer’s actions caused the medical condition nor 
did the suit ask for any damages from any personal injury. 
The jury verdict did find discrimination and awarded the 
taxpayer damages for back pay, attorney’s fees and “personal 
injuries and emotional distress.” Under the taxpayer’s fee 
agreement with the attorney, any attorney fee award decreased 
the contingency fee which would be taken from the damages 
award. During an appeal of the jury verdict, the parties settled, 
with the settlement structured by the taxpayer to reflect 
payment for personal injuries. The court disregarded the 
characterization of the settlement proceeds because the 
defendant employer had no interest in how the settlement was 
characterized, leaving the taxpayer in full power to alter the 
settlement to avoid taxes. The court held that the entire 
settlement proceeds were included in taxable income because 
the initial lawsuit did not allege any physical injuries caused 
by the discriminatory actions of the employer.  Vincent v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-95. 
DEPRECIATION. A large truck stop facility with several 
buildings was held not to be a retail motor fuels outlet because 
less than 50 percent of the total retail floor space was devoted 
to the marketing of petroleum and petroleum products. The 
truck stop included a movie theater, laundromat, arcade, 
restaurant, showers and tv lounge. The court held that these 
facilities were not ordinarily found in retail gas stations; 
therefore, the truck stop was considered a retail convenience 
store and had to claim depreciation deductions based on a 30­
year useful life. See also  Iowa 80 Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries 
v. United States, 347 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2003) (truck stop did 
not qualify as retail motor fuels outlet based on the gross-
revenues test). Iowa 80 Group, Inc. v. I.R.S., 2005-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,343 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 2005-1 U.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,342 (S.D. Iowa 2004). 
Agricultural Law Digest 
DISASTER LOSSES. On April 18, 2005, the President 
determined that certain areas in New Hampshire were eligible 
for assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 USC § 5121) as a result of a record snow 
fall, which began on March 11, 2005. FEMA-3211-EM. 
Accordingly, taxpayers in the affected areas who sustained losses 
may deduct them on their 2004 federal income tax returns. 
INSTALLMENT REPORTING. The taxpayer sold real 
property to unrelated parties in exchange for a promissory note 
payable in installments. The taxpayer’s accountant inadvertently 
failed to report the gain from the sale on the installment method 
but reported the entire gain on the taxpayer’s income tax return. 
The taxpayer requested an extension of time to file an amended 
return which would elect to report the gain on the installment 
method. The IRS granted the extension and the revocation of 
the election out of the installment method of reporting the gain. 
Ltr. Rul. 200517027, Jan. 11, 2005. 
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION. The taxpayer limited 
liability company owned real property which was leased but 
was held primarily for development. The taxpayer learned that 
the city had announced plans to acquire the taxpayer’s property 
and several neighboring properties as part of a public 
development project. The project had proceeded through most 
of the public notice and hearing requirements but before the 
city attempted to acquire the taxpayer’s property, the taxpayer 
sold the property to a third party. The sale contract mentioned 
that the property was part of the proposed public development 
project. The IRS ruled that, although the public project was not 
final at the time of the sale, the taxpayer’s property could be 
considered as sold under threat of condemnation; therefore, the 
taxpayer was eligible for I.R.C. § 1033(a) nonrecognition of 
gain if eligible replacement property is acquired with the 
proceeds of the sale. The IRS cited Rev. Rul. 81-180, 1981-2 
C.B. 161 and stated that “property that is the subject of an 
involuntary conversion or condemnation action need not be 
sold to or acquired by the condemning authority for the relief 
provisions of section 1033 to apply. Additionally, [Rev. Rul. 
81-180] addresses the meaning of the statutory term ‘threat or 
imminence of condemnation,’ and concludes that the sale 
addressed in the case was made under the requisite threat, since 
the property was sold ‘under circumstances in which the 
taxpayer had reasonable grounds to believe that the necessary 
steps to condemn the subject property would eventually have 
been instituted.’” Ltr. Rul. 200518066, Jan. 26, 2005. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
DEFINITION. A trust was formed for the purpose of 
liquidating the assets of some partnerships and corporations. 
Under the trust agreement, the trust could continue the 
investment activities of the original partnerships. Each 
beneficiary’s share in the trust was the same as that person’s 
original interest in the partnerships and corporation. The IRS 
ruled that the trust would be considered a business trust, taxable 
as a partnership because the business activities of the original 
entities were continued and less than 50 percent of the assets 
had been distributed. The IRS also noted that, because there 
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was no change in the ownership shares, the trust could use the 
previous partnership’s tax identification number and the 
partners’ adjusted basis in the assets did not change. Ltr. Rul. 
200517020, Dec. 20, 2004; Ltr. Rul. 200518037, Dec. 20, 
2004. 
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued guidance, in 
question and answer format, concerning the eligibility of multi-
employer plans for making an election to defer net experience 
losses under I.R.C. § 412(b)(7)(F) for the first plan year. The 
election is available for plans which began after June 30, 2003 
and before July 1, 2005. The guidance also covers the effects 
of the election and how to make the election. Notice 2005-40, 
I.R.B. 2005-20. 
For plans beginning in May 2005 for purposes of 
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 
412(c)(7), the corporate bond weighted average is 5.97 percent 
with the permissible range of 5.38 to 5.97 percent (90 to 100 
percent permissible range). The 30-year Treasury securities 
rate for this period is 5.03 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent 
permissible range is 4.52 percent to 5.28 percent, and the 90 
percent to 110 percent permissible range is 4.52 percent to 
5.53 percent. Notice 2005-39, I.R.B. 2005-20. 
REPAIRS. The taxpayer owned aircraft used in the 
taxpayer’s freight business. The engines on the aircraft were 
periodically repaired based on actual damage or scheduled 
maintenance required either by the engine manufacturer or by 
federal regulations. The court held that the costs of the aircraft 
engine maintenance were currently deductible as repairs. The 
appellate court affirmed. See also Harl, “Repair or Capitalize?” 
14 Agric. L. Dig. 177 (2003). FedEx Corp. v. United States, 
No. 03-6514 (6th Cir. May 3, 2005), aff’g, 291 F. Supp.2d 
699 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). 
TRUSTS. The taxpayer owned two grantor trusts. One trust 
owned a life insurance policy on the life of the taxpayer and 
the trustee transferred the life insurance policy to the other 
trustee in exchange for valuable consideration. The IRS ruled 
that the transfer would be disregarded for income tax purposes 
and would not be considered a transfer for value under I.R.C. 
§ 101(a)(2). Ltr. Rul. 200518061, Jan. 14, 2005. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS. The 
taxpayer was injured in 2000 while employed and received 
workers’ compensation benefits from 2000 to 2002. In 2002, 
the taxpayer also applied for and received social security 
benefits, which were reduced by the amount of workers’ 
compensation payments. The taxpayer excluded the workers’ 
compensation payments from income because the payments 
reduced the social security payments. The court acknowledged 
the apparent unfairness of the rule that workers’ compensation 
payments are taxable only if they reduce social security 
payments; however, the court cited an explicit U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling, Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating 
& Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974) and legislative history 
that I.R.C. § 83(d)(3) properly requires the inclusion of 
workers’ compensation payments in taxable income if the 
payments reduce taxable social security payments. Note that 
the taxpayer had received workers’ compensation payments in 
excess of the reduction of the social security benefits. The excess 
amount was not taxable. Flores v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 
Op. 2005-57. 
LANDLORD AND TENANT 
TERMINATION. The defendant had entered into a farm cash 
lease with the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest.  The lease 
provided that the lease would continue year to year unless notice 
of termination was executed by either party not less than four 
months before the end of the current lease year, February 28. 
The original land owner owned only a life tenancy in the land 
and the plaintiff acquired title to the land at the death of the life 
tenant. The life tenant died on November 22 and two days later 
the plaintiff served written notice of termination of the lease on 
the defendant. The defendant argued that the termination could 
not occur until the following year because the termination notice 
was executed less than four months before February 28. The 
lease provided that its terms were binding on the heirs of both 
parties. Under 735 ILCS 5/9--206.1(a), cash rent tenancies from 
year to year in which the lessor is a life tenant, continue only to 
the end of the lease year in which the life tenancy terminated 
unless otherwise specifically provided in the lease. The court 
also held that the lease provision binding heirs did not apply to 
the plaintiff because the plaintiff took title to the property as a 
reminder holder and not as an heir to the life tenant. Olmstead 
v. Nodland, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 403 (Ill. Ct. App. 2005). 
PROBATE 
TRUST. The decedent’s spouse had established a 
testamentary trust which, at the spouse’s death, created two 
trusts. One of which was a marital trust for the decedent. At the 
death of the decedent, the marital trust property, consisting of 
closely-held corporate stock and funds in a brokerage account, 
passed to the other trust for family members. The trust provided 
that a portion of federal and state inheritance taxes was to be 
paid from the marital trust to the extent the marital trust was 
included in the decedent’s estate. The trial court ruled that the 
payment from the marital trust was to be divided pro-rata 
between the stock and brokerage account funds. Some of the 
family members argued that Iowa Code §§ 633.436 and 633.449 
required the taxes be paid first from the brokerage account funds. 
The trial court disagreed and held that the statutes did not apply 
because the trust designated payment of the tax liability from 
the entire marital trust. Although the Iowa Supreme Court 
expressed doubt that the statutes did not apply, the Court upheld 
the trial court on other grounds. The Court cited In re Estate of 
Ohrt, 585 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1998), in which the decedent’s 
property included real and personal property and the decedent’s 
will provided that all debts and taxes should be paid from the 
personal property before any distribution was made to 
beneficiaries. In Estate of Ohrt, the Court rejected the argument 
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that, under Iowa Code § 633.436, the taxes and debts were to be 
paid from the residuary estate before being paid from specific 
bequests. In Estate of Ohrt, the Court held that all personal 
property in the estate was subject to payment of the debts and 
taxes because the decedent’s will did not make any distinction 
between specific and residuary bequests. Similarly, in this case, 
the trust did not make a distinction between the types of trust 
property subject to payment of the taxes; therefore, the court 
upheld the trial court’s ruling that the taxes were to be paid pro-
rata from the stock and the brokerage funds. In re John B. 
Rinaldo Revocable Trust, No. 29/03-2051, 2005 Iowa Sup. 
LEXIS 63 (Iowa Sup. Ct. May 6, 2005). 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
HERBICIDE. The plaintiffs were tomato growers who had 
fields near rice crops on which was used a herbicide 
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that their 
crops were damaged by the herbicide which drifted onto their 
fields and brought claims under negligence and strict liability 
that the herbicide was unreasonably dangerous. The defendant 
argued that the claims were barred by preemption of FIFRA. 
Although the plaintiffs provided some evidence that there was 
no method of applying the herbicide to rice without damage to 
nearby tomato fields, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to 
prove that there was no safe method of applying the herbicide; 
therefore, the claims were based on the failure of the labels to 
provide safe instructions and the claims were preempted by 
FIFRA. The appellate court affirmed. The precedential value of 
the holding in the case may be minimal because the court based 
its holding of preemption on the effect on the label contents. 
This standard has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court as 
noted in Roger McEowen’s article at the beginning of this issue. 
Hardin v. BASF Corp., 397 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 
290 F. Supp.2d 964 (E.D. Ark. 2003). 
PROPERTY 
ABANDONED PUBLIC ROAD. The parties were rural farm 
neighbors and an old public road ran between their properties. 
The road was created by implied or common law dedication in 
that the surrounding property owners did not attempt to prevent 
the public from using the land as a road. The court noted that 
the previous property owners had fenced their properties along 
the road in acknowledgement of the road as a public road. The 
court also noted that no title to the public road was ever conveyed 
to the county. The plaintiffs had placed gates on the road, posted 
no trespassing signs and built cattle panels on the road area. 
The defendants argued that the gates and panels were illegal 
because they blocked a public road. The defendants also argued 
that the abandonment could not occur as a result of the plaintiffs’ 
closing of access to the road. The court upheld the trial court’s 
ruling that the public road was abandoned, citing testimony that 
the property had not been used as a road by anyone for 30 years. 
The court also stated that the evidence demonstrated that a good 
portion of the road was impassable because the use of the land 
for cattle pasture. Kleeman v. Kingsley, 2005 Mo. App. LEXIS 
723 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
SUBSTITUTED CONTRACT. The debtors, husband and 
wife, were farmers who had obtained operating loans from a 
creditor. The debtors defaulted on the loans and filed for Chapter 
7 bankruptcy. The wife objected to the validity of a claim by the 
creditor, arguing that the wife was not liable for the loan because 
the loan was taken out solely by the husband. Although the 
debtors had jointly signed previous loans, the loan in question 
was alleged by the wife to be a substitution for the previous 
loans, thus releasing the wife from liability for the loans. The 
court rejected the wife’s claims, pointing to the failure of the 
debtors to prove that the substituted loan was approved by the 
creditor or that the loan was intended to pay off any previous 
obligations of the wife to the creditor.  In re Schaefer, 2005 
Bankr. LEXIS 710 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005). 
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